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THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC 

* 

Edwin  Lee  Norton 

I 

This  paper  approaches  musical  experience  from  one, 
and  that  an  often  neglected  side.  It  is  concerned,  not 
with  an  account  of  all  the  more  essential  factors  in  mu- 
sical appreciation  in  their  due  relation  to  each  other,  but 
rather  with  the  function  of  relations  in  the  appreciative 
process,  with  its  conceptual  or  universal  aspects.  While 
the  nature  of  music  as  an  art  will  not  be  forgotten,  it  is 
hoped  to  elucidate  this  from  a particular  point  of  view. 
Accordingly  our  thesis  will  accent  musical  thought  rather 
than  musical  feeling.  This  may  explain  the  apparent 
one-sidedness  and  intellectualism  of  the  view  that  is  to  be 
developed. 

It  is  proposed  to  take  thought  in  the  broad  sense  of 
the  mind’s  apprehension  of  meaning  and  relations,  whether 
or  no  this  is  found  in  a developed  and  highly  complicated 
and  abstract  form.  This  certainly  is  the  germ  of  thought. 
It  is  presupposed  that  all  cognition  involves  thinking,  and 
that  the  cognitive  aspect  of  a concrete  process  of  appre- 
ciation is  of  aesthetic  importance ; i.  e.  that  thought  has  a 
function  in  music.  One  may  distinguish  between  the  logic 
of  philosophic  and  scientific  procedure  as  formulated  in 
the  text-books  on  deduction  and  induction,  the  logic  of 
practical  life  found  in  various  degrees  of  perfection  from 
crude  purposive  thinking  up,  and  the  logic  of  aesthetic 
experience.  At  the  same  time,  these  have  a common 


IbdliO 


1G8  STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 


ground,  and  a part  of  our  aim  will  be  to  point  out  their 
essential  similarity. 

The  logical  function  of  musical  ideas  is  to  control  musi- 
cal experience,  to  secure  appropriate  reactions  and  reali- 
zations. The  method  of  the  readjustment  of  the  parts 
within  the  whole  process  through  the  instrumentality  of 
the  universal  is  logical  so  far  as  it  is  adequate;  it  becomes 
illogical,  but  not  alogical,  through  its  failure.  The  logic 
of  the  experience  is  its  universality,  its  adherence  to  musi- 
cal law,  its  adequacy.  Thus  the  rationale  of  appreciation 
is  the  doctrine  of  its  immanent  logic.  Premising  the  prag- 
matic view  of  the  function  of  knowledge,  one  may  rightly 
speak  thus  of  the  logic  of  music,  as  of  that  of  any  con- 
crete process  of  experience.1 

Musical  thought  exhibits  different  stages  of  develop- 
ment ranging  from  sensuous  feeling  to  inference.  The 
affectively  toned  related  sensation  may  function  as  a sign 
of  meanings  determined  in  previous  experience.  In  listen- 
ing,, the  perceptual  phase  of  thought  is  always  present. 
Concrete  imagination  in  terms  of  auditory  and  other  im- 
agery often  plays  a part,  but  thought  may  take  a more 
abstract  form.  The  inner  connections  of  the  music  may 
be  attentively  observed,  or  the  process  may  be  one  of  sys- 
tematic association  based  on  previous  thought,  — a pro- 
cess still  purposive  even  if  lacking  conscious  control.  But 
whatever  the  structural  form,  the  universal  aspect  of  the 
process  is  of  prime  functional  importance.  As  every 
relationship  within  or  between  melody,  rhythm,  and  har- 
mony has  such  a universal  character,  then  attention  to 
these  relations,  whatever  they  be,  is  thought  activity,  and 
it  is  judgmental  in  function. 

1 Cf.  Dewey,  Studies  in  Logical  Theory , p.  19.  I am  glad  to  acknow- 
ledge also  my  general  indebtedness  to  Professor  Dewey’s  method  and  point 
of  view. 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC  169 

A preliminary  word  is  in  order  regarding  the  relation 
between  musical  appreciation  and  thinking.  Just  as  logi- 
cal thought  cannot  ultimately  be  divorced  from  sensation, 
feeling,  and  action,  so  can  the  converse  be  maintained: 
that  musical  feeling  is  not  divorced  from  thought.  These 
are  terms  in  a continuity,  phases  of  an  organic  process. 
No  rigid  line  can  be  drawn  between  philosophic,  religious, 
and  sesthetic  contemplation,  as  is  evidenced  by  the  imagina- 
tive views  of  Plato  and  many  another  poet-metaphysician. 
Contemplation  may  be  discursive  as  well  as  intuitive.  If 
the  function  of  thought  is  confined  to  the  determination 
of  the  relations  within  the  ideal  musical  world,  such  dis- 
interested practical  play  of  the  mind  is  certainly  sesthetic; 
it  is  an  attempt  more  explicitly  to  realize  the  ideal  com- 
pleteness of  the  art  object. 

Musical  value  is  found  neither  in  mere  affective  quality 
nor  in  mere  sensation,  nor  in  mere  emotion ; these  are  signs, 
materials,  or  summaries  of  a value  greater  than  they- 
Musical  value  is  not  merely  immediate,  nor  is  it  consti- 
tuted and  finished  once  for  all.  It  is  rather  a process  as 
continual  and  unceasing  as  the  music;  it  is  progressively 
determined  and  in  part  constituted  by  intellectual  media- 
tion. 

Before  entering  upon  our  main  theme  we  should  notice 
the  contrast  between  the  implied  and  the  explicated  aspects 
of  musical  thought.  Universal  relationships  and  meanings 
are  sometimes  assumed  or  taken  for  granted  as  far  as 
their  determinate  character  is  concerned ; or  a^ain  they 
are  merely  suggested  rather  than  clearly  grasped  and 
given  explicit  statement  in  the  mind.  Every  one  admits 
the  prominence  of  this  suggestive  phase  of  art,  especially 
of  music ; but  its  logical  import  is  seldom  recognized. 

Two  chief  functions  of  the  implications  of  musical 
thought  may  be  distinguished,  retrospective  and  prospec- 


170  STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 


tive  reference.  On  the  one  hand  there  are  assumptions 
of  meanings  that  were  developed  and  explicitly  realized  in 
previous  time ; on  the  other  there  are  suggestions  of  mean- 
ings not  yet  determined  by  attentive  scrutiny.  All  thought 
has  its  familiar  and  novel  aspects,  either  of  which  may 
be  in  a measure  implied,  and  either  such  implication  may  be 
a means  of  controlling  the  development  of  the  other ; i.  e. 
its  enrichment  and  better  accommodation  to  the  total  situ- 
ation. 

The  last  sentence  indicates  why  the  implicit  element 
may  have  logical  value.  Its  ability  to  control  the  appre- 
ciative process  and  to  realize  the  meaning  of  past  or 
future  in  their  connection  with  the  present,  is  based  upon 
its  felt  power  of  substitution.  In  the  emergence  of  the 
explicit  from  the  implicit  or  vice  versa , the  product  is 
significant  because  it  represents  portions  of  the  previous 
process.  In  thus  pointing  beyond  itself,  the  implicit  has 
vicarious  value  and  is  conceptual  in  function.  So  it  may 
serve  to  develop,  define,  and  refine  the  aesthetic  suscepti- 
bility. 

The  influence  of  harmony  on  melody  may  be  cited  as 
an  illustration  of  the  logical  value  of  the  implicit  factor. 
In  many  instances,  such  as  the  Pilgrims’  Chorus  from 
“Tannhauser”  and  Schubert’s  “Am  Meer, ” the  thought 
implications  determine  for  the  appreciator  the  nature  of 
the  melody;  for  this  would  be  very  different  without  his 
vague  feeling  of  its  harmonic  setting,  whether  this  ac- 
companiment is  a part  of  the  actual  presentation  or  only 
tends  to  an  imaginative  revival.  If  a melody  has  been 
learned  first  without  the  accompaniment  designed  for  it, 
the  latter  may  be  found  objectionable.  One  may  resent 
its  determinations  as  making  changes  that,  according  to 
one’s  previous  conception  of  the  melody,  ought  not  to  be 
permitted  in  its  intrinsic  relations.  Such  was  the  history 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC  171 

of  the  writer’s  acquaintance  with  Jensen’s  “ Lehn’  deine 
Wang’.”  In  such  a case  the  introduction  of  the  harmony 
causes  a psychical  disturbance  whose  logical  import  is  the 
tendency  to  remodel  either  the  objective  composition  as 
regards  its  harmony  or  the  subjective  appreciation  of  its 
melodic  meaning. 


II 

Musical  concepts  are  general  ideas  or  notions  that  spring 
from  the  concrete  experience  of  music,  are  gradually  sys- 
tematized in  musical  theory,  and  thus  become  a source 
of  further  deductions  in  the  intellectual  world  as  well  as 
instruments  of  practical  guidance  in  musical  activity.  A 
variety  of  examples  will  now  be  described  and  classified, 
for  this  seems  to  be  the  most  illuminating  approach  to  the 
subject.  The  examples  will  be  given  without  observing 
any  special  distinction  between  the  more  explicit  and  the 
less  consciously  developed  concepts.  It  is  not  contended 
that  they  are  all  clearly  present  in  the  ordinary  musical 
experience.  But  assuming  their  compatibility,  when  thus 
developed,  with  musical  activity,  they  deserve  notice  under 
the  general  caption  of  concepts. 

Music  has  three  aspects,  three  sources  of  value,  known 
as  material,  form,  and  expression,  and  in  different  degrees 
these  are  conditions  of  our  reacting  toward  stimulation 
as  musical.  The  primary  logical  division  is  that  between 
the  musical  and  the  non-musical  world.  So  tone  as  op- 
posed to  noise ; organic  combination  in  accordance  with 
musical  law  as  contrasted  with  either  the  isolated  element 
or  mere  incoherent  juxtaposition  ; vitality,  soul,  and  asso- 
ciative value  (whether  personal  or  objective)  as  opposed 
to  mechanical  deadness  or  emotional  indifference,  — these 
three  are  among  the  most  general  musical  concepts.  The 
inner  constitution  of  each  one  involves  more  than  the 


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STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 


mere  abstract  common  element ; each  involves  a tendency 
to  differentiation ; the  concept  of  form  implies  types  of 
form  and  details  of  musical  law ; that  of  expression  implies 
modes  of  expression,  etc.  This  remark  holds  good  through 
the  whole  list  of  concepts  that  are  to  be  noticed,  which, 
by  the  way,  fall  mainly  under  the  category  of  form  or 
structure. 

A highly  systematic  concept  is  exemplified  by  the 
musical  scale.  In  this  notion,  abstraction  is  made  from 
rhythm  and  all  other  features  of  concrete  music  save 
melody  and  harmony,  so  as  to  effect  an  arrangement  in 
serial  order  of  all  those  relative  pitches  which  are  avail- 
able as  musical  material.  The  use  of  this  concept  accord- 
ing to  musical  laws  reveals  its  nature,  which  is  further 
specified  in  part  through  the  three  important  notions  of 
distance,  direction,  and  melodic  relation  or  affinity.  These 
are  all  relational  concepts ; but  in  its  higher  development 
and  taken  psychologically,  distance  is  a quantitative 
determination  of  relation,  while  in  direction  and  affinity 
relation  remains  a simple  quality. 

Any  tone  in  a melody,  as  regards  its  mere  pitch,  then, 
is  conceived  as  part  of  this  complex  system  and  as  having 
a locus  determined  by  it.  For  first,  it  has  a place  in  the 
ascending-descending  series,  separated  by  a definite  inter- 
val from  other  known  tones.  And  second,  it  has  a recog- 
nized and  distinct  affinity  for  one  or  other  of  these  tones. 
Here  its  relation  to  the  tonic  is  the  most  important  con- 
ceptual feature  of  the  system.  In  any  phase  of  musical 
activity,  whether  composition,  performance,  or  apprecia- 
tion, the  use  of  the  scale  concept  consists  in  its  enabling 
one  to  pass  in  an  orderly  fashion,  involving  on  the  whole 
a minimum  of  groping  and  of  friction  (so  far  as  is 
consistent  with  realizing  the  various  particular  logical 
moments  involved  in  musical  and  aesthetic  activity),  from 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC  173 

any  one  point  to  another  in  the  series.  Of  course  some 
friction  is  present  in  all  readaptation,  and  is  at  the  basis 
of  all  aesthetic  consciousness  and  particularly  of  those 
logical  meaning’s  so  essential  in  musical  structure.  The 
nature  of  the  “ orderly  fashion  ” of  transitions  is  deter- 
mined by  the  subordinate  concepts,  distance,  direction, 
and  relation,  under  the  control  of  higher  aesthetic  laws. 

While  the  locus  of  a tone  is  definite,  this  is  not  con- 
ceived as  a mathematical  point  in  a line,  but  as  a place 
of  possible  variation  between  limits  almost  indistinguish- 
able. Within  such  limits,  points  are  taken  as  equivalent. 
The  scale  in ' its  essential  features  as  just  described  is 
indifferent  also  to  absolute  pitch ; all  that  the  concept 
requires  is  a systematic  adjustment  of  part  to  part  within 
the  whole.  Therefore  we  speak  of  one  and  the  same 
melody  as  being  sung  in  different  pitches,  since  the  sys- 
tematic relationships  are  the  same  in  the  two  cases.  But 
when  such  a recurrence  of  the  melody  is  within  one  mu- 
sical Avhole,  the  concept  of  modulation  or  of  a dependent 
melody  must  be  introduced  to  signify  that  we  have  two 
equivalent  systems  of  relations  focused  about  different 
points  which  are  themselves  related.  This  is  like  a play 
within  a play,  or  a dream  that  one  is  dreaming.  The  con- 
cept of  variation  within  limits  is  for  application  system- 
atized in  the  scale  of  equal  temperament,  and  this  it  is 
that  makes  possible  a recognition  of  the  melody’s  broader 
external  relationships,  and  permits  us  still  within  an  ex- 
tended composition  to  admit  the  two  melodies  as  identical. 

Rhythm  is  a systematic  concept  in  which  the  princi- 
ple of  equivalence  is  important.  The  musical  movement 
is  divided  into  successive  parts,  measures  or  fractions 
thereof,  and  each  part  has  vicarious  value,  being  capable 
of  substitution  for  any  other  part  of  the  same  rhythmic 
grade.  Thus  measure  is  equivalent  to  measure,  or  eighth 


174 


STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 


note  to  its  fellow.  Even  the  stressed  tones  that  mark  the 
rhythm  are  equivalent  to  the  unstressed,  for  the  accent 
can  be  shifted  to  a novel  position,  as  exhibited  in  synco- 
pation, in  which  heat  and  stress  are  at  variance.  As  the 
scale  is  primarily  concerned  with  relative  rather  than  with 
absolute  pitches,  so  to  rhythm  the  absolute  point  of  stress 
is  of  less  importance  than  is  the  regular  recurrence  of 
stress.  A melody  may  or  may  not  begin  on  the  accented 
beat ; and  of  its  various  phrases,  some  may  begin  one  way 
and  some  the  other.  A measure  is  capable  of  extended 
division  and  subdivision  after  such  manner  as  to  render 
four  eighth  notes  equivalent  to  a half  note  in  the  rhythmic 
figure,  or  vice  versa.  Measure  is  a proper  substitute  for 
measure,  whatever  its  complexity  or  simplicity,  through- 
out the  one  melody.  Thus  the  principle  of  rhythm  is  the 
recurrence,  according  to  a regular  abstract  order,  of 
stimulations  or  groups  of  stimulations. 

However,  rhythm  is  not  identical  with  tempo,  for  either 
may  change  while  the  other  remains  the  same  ; nor  does 
its  equivalence  amount  to  mathematical  equality,  though 
rhythmic  figure  has  a mathematical  as  well  as  a psycho- 
logical basis.  While  the  numbers  indicating  rhythmic 
divisions  signify  relative  durations,  the  demands  of  ex- 
pression interfere  with  their  accurate  observance.  Every 
measure  or  rhythmical  unit  begins  with  a beat,  a regularly 
recurrent  and  significant  pulsation,  but  the  bearer  of  this 
significance,  the  mark  of  the  principal  rhythmic  division, 
need  not  always  be  the  same  kind  of  content.  V ery  fre- 
quently it  is  stress  on  the  first  tone  of  the  beat,  increased 
intensity  of  attack.  But  it  may  consist  in  the  lengthened 
relative  duration  of  this  first  tone  at  the  expense  of  those 
directly  following  it,  a just  perceptible  variation  from  the 
equality  of  the  fractional  parts  of  the  rhythmic  unit.  Of 
course  either  of  these  methods  occasionally  may  come  into 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC 


175 


conflict  with  expressional  devices.  The  latter  one  is  said 
to  have  been  used  and  taught  very  effectively  by  the 
violinist  Joachim. 

All  rhythm  both  embodies  and  meets  the  requisite  that 
the  various  phases  of  a process  should  come  at  the  right 
time.  It  seems  to  be  the  simplest  solution  of  that  need 
become  an  objective  demand.  In  the  broader  life  of  hu- 
manity our  various  modes  of  measuring  time  are  regula- 
tors of  activity,  important  instruments  in  the  process  of 
socializing  behavior,  which  aid  (though  they  do  not  re- 
quire) rhythmic  and  concerted  action.  In  proportion  as 
one’s  mode  of  daily  life  is  rhythmic  can  his  habits  agree 
with  those  of  others ; he  becomes  able  to  eat,  work,  play, 
and  sleep  when  others  do.  So  in  music,  while  there  is  an 
individual,  organic,  and  aesthetic  basis  for  rhythm,  the 
teleology  controlling  its  early  development  has  been  largely 
social,  either  because  of  the  connection  of  song  with  group 
work  or  the  dance,  or  because  of  the  need  of  a unifying 
factor  in  purely  musical  ensemble  performance.  Appar- 
ently, then,  as  a quantitative,  mathematical  concept,  its 
demands  would  be  best  satisfied  by  complete  mechaniza- 
tion. As  it  is  indispensable  that  we  live  by  the  clock, 
should  not  musical  thought  and  practice  be  regulated  by 
the  metronome  ? 

I believe  that  life  and  music  are  in  this  respect  quite 
analogous,  and  that  here  music  may  be  taken  as  symbolic 
of  life.  An  erroneous  view  of  the  subject  is  due  wholly 
to  neglect  of  essential  factors,  to  one-sidedness.  The  above 
discussion  makes  patent  the  presence  in  the  function  of 
the  rhythmic  concept  of  a dialectic  between  subjective 
and  objective  values,  between  individual  and  social  needs, 
and  between  the  demands  of  expression  and  of  form.  But 
the  two  sets  of  values  or  needs  must  be  harmonized,  for 
each  value  positively  involves  the  other.  Music  is  to  a 


176 


STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 


great  extent  a social  phenomenon,  and  a performer,  in 
order  to  make  a piece  comprehensible  to  hearers,  must 
not  only  phrase  and  accent  carefully,  but  must  approach 
in  his  rendering  the  ideal  of  equality  between  durations  ; 
only  thus  can  the  composer  and  himself  express  them- 
selves and  human  life  through  the  music.  Regular  rates 
of  acceleration  or  retardation  are  quite  compatible  with 
this,  and  any  other  temporal  changes  that  leave  one  in 
no  doubt  as  to  the  relation  between  stresses  ; but  spas- 
modic playing  is  rarely  legitimate.  The  notion  of  varia- 
tion within  limits  applies  even  more  patently  here  than 
to  pitch.  The  limits  are  determined  by  the  relation  that 
must  obtain  between  subjective  stresses  and  objective 
durations.  For  these  must  in  all  cases  correspond.  Mea- 
sured durations  are  the  chief  counters  by  means  of  which 
feelings  of  relative  stress  can  be  communicated.  Objec- 
tive stress  is  another  means,  but  its  use  is  more  often 
interfered  with  either  by  the  complexity  of  rhythmic  figure 
or  by  the  demands  of  expression.  The  relative  durations 
are  then  to  be  regarded  as  the  equivalents  of  subjective 
rhythmic  feelings,  and  as  the  proper  substitutes  for  them. 
It  may  be  a fact  that  one  with  a good  time  sense  often 
has  a poor  sense  for  rhythm,  or  vice  versa;  but  this  is  not 
the  musical  ideal. 

The  distinction  between  individual  and  general  con- 
cepts should  be  illustrated.  Under  the  former  falls  the 
idea  of  any  particular  motive  or  phrase  as  this  identical 
self-subsistent  whole.  Among  the  constituents  of  such 
an  idea  are  certain  universal  qualities  of  the  object.  The 
functioning  of  such  an  idea  is  seen  in  memory  and  recog- 
nition, and  in  a judgment  of  value  about  the  object. 
One  has  a general  concept  when  some  aspect  of  a con- 
crete movement,  possibly  shared  by  other  movements,  is 
noticed  or  becomes  an  important  feature  in  interpretation, 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC  177 

— when,  for  instance,  a melodic  or  harmonic  relation, 
abstracted  from  its  setting  in  tone  color  and  rhythm,  is 
taken  as  a type  and  identified  in  various  contexts. 

Certain  concepts  are  of  great  importance  for  guidance, 
particularly  in  performance,  but  also  in  the  other  phases 
of  musical  activity.  Consider  how  important  for  inter- 
pretation is  the  constant  functioning  of  the  sense  for  the 
keynote ; the  feeling  of  what  the  main  rhythm  is,  how- 
ever disguised  (for  instance  the  2/4  figure),  and  the  rela- 
tive tempo  (e.  g.  an  accelerando  in  allegro) ; an  idea  of 
the  style  (as  cantabile  or  pizzicato),  or  of  the  dynamic 
continuity  or  change  (e.  g.  constant  pianissimo,  or  cres- 
cendo and  alternate  accents).  Notice  that  among  the 
manifold  possible  characteristics  of  musical  progression, 
certain  ones  are  found  sometimes  together,  sometimes 
separate.  This  not  only  makes  possible  the  development 
of  the  distinct  concepts,  but  their  origin  is  due  to  the 
need  that  the  tendencies  and  habitual  reactions  from 
which  they  spring  should  be  differentiated  and  better 
adapted.  Thus  the  temporal  and  dynamic  changes  just 
mentioned  may  be  quite  distinct,  and  there  may  be  need 
to  resist  a tendency  to  interpret  accelerando  also  as  cres- 
cendo. The  fact  that  many  aspects  of  musical  movement 
are  indicated  in  the  score  by  words  shows  their  conceptual 
nature ; for  pitch  and  rhythm  are  not  the  whole  of  music. 
At  the  same  time  it  is  the  least  complex,  intricate,  and 
intellectual  aspects  of  the  music  for  which  these  directive 
words  stand ; and  the  comparative  absence  of  words, 
whether  on  the  score  or  in  the  auditor’s  mind,  to  express 
the  most  essentially  structural  side  of  music  should  not 
blind  one  to  its  intellectual  nature  any  more  than  the  use 
of  signs  in  algebra. 

To  the  hearer  such  guiding  concepts  are  none  the  less 
of  value  though  words  may  not  arise  as  their  symbols, 


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though  one  could  not  give  them  a technical  explication, 
and  though  they  may  never  function  save  in  the  presence 
of  positive  or  negative  examples.  The  activity  of  one  of 
them  (e.  g.  the  tonic  feeling)  not  only  aids  in  the  apper- 
ception of  this  special  feature  of  the  music,  but  within 
certain  limits  helps  the  mind  grasp  the  whole  movement. 
Yet  it  is  true  that  too  keen  a sense  for  one  feature,  like 
rhythm,  may  interfere,  not  perhaps  with  an  easy  reaction, 
but  with  a discriminative,  objectively  valid  reaction  to  the 
complex  object.  Some  of  these  concepts  aid  one  in  storing 
in  mind  subtle  and  not  readily  describable  characteristics 
of  a piece  which  become  important  logical  factors  in  one’s 
assessment  of  its  value,  though  they  are  not  made  abstract 
objects.  One  may  feel  the  pizzicato  accompaniment  by  the 
orchestra  as  having  a peculiar  fitness,  without  contrasting 
it  with  the  absent  legato;  or  a passage  may  be  noticed  as 
an  unaccelerated  crescendo  in  that  it  is  noticed  as  it  is  in 
its  wholeness. 

The  description  of  guiding  concepts  has  more  than 
once  suggested  and  illustrated  the  last  group  to  be  dealt 
with,  that  of  abstract  musical  outlines.  A concrete  musi- 
cal progression  may  be  viewed  as  the  vital  union  of  differ- 
ent aspects  (this  does  not  refer  to  stages  or  brief  portions) 
of  the  movement,  which  are  in  themselves  not  music,  and 
which  may,  whether  in  whole  or  in  part,  be  embodied  in 
other  pieces.  There  are  outlines  of  the  first  and  of  the 
second  degree.  (1)  Principal  outlines  are  illustrated  by 
abstracting  any  one  of  the  following  aspects  completely 
from  a musical  whole,  be  it  long  or  short,  — melody,  har- 
monic accompaniment,  rhythm,  tempo,  and  dynamic  fea- 
tures. Each  of  these  is  an  abstract  though  fairly  particu- 
lar form.  If  it  be  long,  it  will  be  proportionately  vague 
and  uncertain  and,  like  a long  piece  of  music,  capable 
of  thorough  comprehension  only  by  its  serial  expansion. 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC  179 

Such  expansion  will  either  reveal  the  inadequacies  of  the 
outline  concept  or,  in  case  tendencies  to  error  are  readily 
checked,  show  its  perfection.  (2)  The  subordinate  outlines 
are  abstractions  from  the  principal  ones,  and  are  instanced 
by  the  following  discriminations : In  melody  one  can  ab- 
stract a theme  out  of  the  body  of  its  variations,  and  in 
general  can  distinguish  the  essentially  structural  portion 
from  the  ornamental,  though  where  the  line  should  be 
drawn  is  often  theoretically  uncertain.  Trills,  turns,  grace 
notes,  often  accidentals,  can  sometimes  be  ranked  as  or- 
naments. When  dependent  melodies  are  incorporated  in 
the  melody  of  the  primary  tonic,  the  different  melodies 
thus  interwoven  can  to  some  extent  be  discriminated,  cer- 
tainly in  study.  In  harmony,  crucial  chords  and  changes 
can  be  detected  which  give  special  significance  to  their 
context.  The  distinction  of  the  separate  melodies  in  a 
piece  of  polyphony  by  Bach  would  yield  outlines  of  this 
order,  or  of  the  first;  for  each  outline  here  is  more  indi- 
vidual (at  least  in  its  union  with  rhythm)  than  most  of  the 
subordinate  outlines.  Finally,  the  main  rhythmic  outline 
may  be  abstracted  from  its  complications,  divisions,  and 
details;  also  differences  of  rhythm  connected  with  the 
component  melodies  of  polyphony,  as  in  syncopation  when 
the  absolute  accents  of  the  parts  do  not  concur,  or  in 
case  of  duple  rhythm  in  one  part  and  triple  in  another. 
Such  a distinction  of  rhythm  also  makes  it  easier  to  dis- 
tinguish the  melodic  components  in  polyphony. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  to  insist  on  the  constant  pre- 
sence in  the  hearer’s  mind  of  a great  variety  of  such  out- 
lines as  structural  existents  would  both  do  violence  to  the 
psychological  facts  and  tend  to  sacrifice  the  aesthetic  for 
an  intellectual  attitude  to  music.  The  objector  puts  two 
questions : (1)  Are  musical  outlines  either  a fact  or  a 
possibility  in  the  auditor  as  such  ? and  if  so,  (2)  are  they 


180 


STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 


of  any  utility  to  appreciation  ? A single  answer,  however, 
will  suffice  for  both  questions ; since  if  such  phenomena 
had  no  valid  function  within  the  art,  we  can  he  sure  they 
would  have  no  existence  there,  generally  speaking ; their 
usual  presence  would  be  a pretty  good  indication  of  their 
usefulness.  Now  there  is  no  doubt  that  when  one  is  not 
in  the  aesthetic  attitude,  all  the  concepts  described  and 
many  more  are  possible  constructions.  Nor  is  there  any 
doubt  that  some  of  these  products  of  intellectual  study 
serve  to  enrich  the  subsequent  enjoyment  of  music.  Both 
their  importance  and  the  ease  of  their  formation  vary,  and 
not  always  concomitantly.  In  the  more  complex  and  in- 
tellectual forms  of  music,  melody  may  be  a more  impor- 
tant feature  than  rhythm,  at  least  it  is  not  inferior  to  it. 
But  rhythm  is  more  readily  treated  as  an  abstract  outline 
than  is  melody,  and  for  two  reasons  : melody  is  employed 
only  in  music,  while  rhythm  is  embodied  in  various  other 
activities ; and  again,  melody  naturally  seeks  a rhythmic 
embodiment.  The  latter  reason  implies  that  all  music  is 
rhythmical,  and  is  therefore  weakened  by  the  undoubted 
fact  of  a class  of  arhythmical  music,  in  which  either  har- 
mony substitutes  for  rhythm  as  a unifying  factor  (as  in  the 
chorals  of  the  Middle  Ages),  or  strict  musical  form  is  sac- 
rificed to  expression  (as  in  the  recitative).  Dynamic  form 
is  an  example  of  a feature  somewhat  readily  abstracted  by 
the  hearer.  It  is  true  the  rhythm  is  apt  to  adhere  to  it,  for 
rhythm  tends  more  than  any  other  feature  to  interpene- 
trate the  whole  movement.  Still  the  dynamic  values  may 
he  noticeably  felt  for  themselves,  since  they  correspond  to 
typical  forms  of  emotional  manifestation  and  in  a sense 
express  spiritual  life  in  the  abstract.  For  the  same  reason 
the  dynamic  outlines  as  well  as  the  rhythmic  are  of  real 
aesthetic  utility. 

When  on  the  one  hand  a critic  denies  the  value  of  mu- 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC  181 

sical  outlines  as  well  as  of  the  theoretical  training  that 
might  foster  them,  and  on  the  other  hand  insists  that  mu- 
sical value  is  based  on  structure  and  therefore  that  the 
active  attitude,  which  makes  an  effort  to  grasp  and  master 
the  object,  is  superior  to  the  passive  one,  in  which  the 
auditor  is  overwhelmed  by  the  mere  stimulation  in  its 
quality  and  mass, — this  looks  like  a contradiction,  though 
its  author  may  regard  it  as  only  a difference  of  stress  and 
of  degree.  Of  the  two  attitudes,  the  active  involves  rela- 
tively more  intellect,  the  passive  more  emotion.  But  all 
intellection  involves  abstraction  of  some  kind  and  degree  ; 
it  implies  tracing  the  relations  which  constitute  an  object. 
One’s  attentive  efforts  cannot  well  be  concerned  with  mere 
feeling ; they  have  to  do  rather  with  the  structural  con- 
tent of  music. 

Music  is  a concrete  organic  form,  of  course,  and  not 
a mechanical  union,  effected  by  the  composer,  of  mere 
abstractions.  It  follows  that  aesthetic  pleasure,  in  the 
narrow  sense,  is  conditioned  by  the  perception  of  the 
unique  individual  unity.  And  no  doubt  this  helps  explain 
why  one  who  goes  to  music  for  enjoyment  fails  to  notice 
some  abstract  likenesses  between  different  pieces  which 
are  patent  to  the  curious  scrutiny  of  the  student,  for  their 
interests  differ.  It  is  true  that  the  phases  of  music  are 
wholly  transformed  through  their  artistic  union,  that  the 
abstract,  as  such,  does  not  exist  in  the  concrete,  and  that 
analysis  in  this  field,  as  throughout  mental  life,  involves 
in  some  sense  the  destruction  of  the  original  unity.  But 
here  the  real  test  and  criterion  of  the  value  of  analysis 
reveals  itself.  ^Esthetic  validity  belongs  to  such  abstract 
analysis  as  tends  to  produce  a new  sense  of  concrete  unity 
and  beauty  enriched  because  altered  by  this  very  process 
from  a relatively  simple  unity  into  a complex  totality. 
The  totality,  whatever  its  structure  and  however  ecstatic 


182  STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 

its  emotion,  embodies  the  significance  of  previous  unities, 
whether  or  not  these  were  appreciated  aesthetically  at  the 
moment  of  their  psychic  existence. 

In  a musical  composition  of  any  length,  every  phrase 
of  independent  beauty  can  be  appreciated  as  it  passes. 
But  it  is  not  absolutely  independent,  and  further  beauty 
is  revealed  when  one  detects  the  connecting  links  between 
the  smaller  units.  Their  significant  similarity  in  melodic 
movement  is  often  connected  with  rhythmic  differences. 
Plenty  of  instances  of  this  kind  could  be  pointed  out  in 
modern  music.  The  danger  to  enjoyment  here  is  not  from 
analysis,  for  this  decidedly  helps,  but  from  want  of  syn- 
thesis. There  is  no  appreciation  of  music  whatever  that 
does  not  alter  the  given  beauty  and  transform  the  stimu- 
lus. Even  the  unity  of  the  brief  phrase  is  not  merely 
given  but  in  part  constructed  by  the  auditor  ; and  in  rela- 
tion to  this  phrase  the  aesthetic  moment  par  excellence , 
the  emotional  sense  of  its  unity  and  meaning,  is  not  in 
its  appearance  strictly  concomitant  with  the  developing 
objective  unity.  This  means  that  even  within  these  nar- 
row limits  of  duration  the  mind  must  do  some  work  with- 
out immediate  returns.  And  how  much  more  is  this  true 
in  proportion  as  the  unity  is  long  and  complex  ! To  sup- 
pose that  every  instant  of  this  development  must  be  char- 
acterized by  heightened  emotion  is  absurd,  and  to  deny 
that  those  more  intellectual  instants,  when  the  mind  is 
scrutinizing  and  meeting  a problem,  are  an  essential  por- 
tion of  the  aesthetic  attitude  as  a process,  seems  arbitrary. 

By  way  of  caution  it  should  be  added  that  the  question 
regarding  outlines  is  not  only  whether  their  content  is  a 
set  of  images  filling  out  a particular  melodic,  rhythmic, 
or  dynamic  form,  but  also  whether  such  outlines  function 
as  controlling  factors  and  often  as  conscious  checks, 
whether  their  meaning  is  embodied  in  more  or  less  con- 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC  183 

scious  habits.  Cases  of  conflicting  or  divergent  associa- 
tion are  best  explained  by  recognizing  such  habit  units  in 
the  total  complex.  When  two  phrases  are  identical  in  all 
respects  save  dynamic  quality,  the  first  being  forte  and 
the  second  diminuendo,  the  tendency  is  to  make  the  sec- 
ond an  exact  repetition  of  the  first  as  long  as  the  habits 
are  not  differentiated,  and  this  may  depend  on  observing 
certain  differences  in  context  which  make  a demand  for 
dynamic  change.  The  fault  is  readily  corrected  when  the 
dynamic  outline  (always  in  some . of  its  connections,  part 
of  which  are  relevant  and  part  irrelevant)  is  given  suffi- 
cient attention  and  so  readapted. 

Both  the  importance  and  the  possibility  of  outlines  is 
exhibited  by  a common  and  useful  method  of  teaching 
music  to  children,  according  to  which  the  pupils  are  to 
study  the  verses,  rhythm,  and  melody  of  a new  song  sepa- 
rately. They  swing  or  beat  out  the  rhythm  or  embody 
it  in  monotone.  The  melody  is  studied  by  reading  and 
practicing  the  various  intervals  and  transitions  therein 
involved  with  frequent  explicit  reference  to  the  scale. 
It  may  surprise  some  to  find  how  much  of  the  spirit  of 
sesthetic  or  artistic  joy  children  can  bring  to  such  exer- 
cises, but  this  need  not  be  insisted  upon  as  a condition  of 
the  value  of  their  abstraction.  In  giving;  attention  to  each 
feature  separately,  qualitative  concepts  are  developed. 
Thus  habits  are  formed  without  clashing,  which  in  ma- 
turer  experience  function  largely  without  being  con- 
sciously distinguished ; yet  their  constant  recombination 
implies  the  universal. 

In  the  mode  of  formation  of  musical  concepts  two  ex- 
tremes may  be  remarked:  (1)  ( a ) When  most  explicit 
there  is  a comparison  of  different  cases  and  abstrac- 
tion of  their  common  element.  The  data  are  really  certain 
habits  of  reaction  raised  into  consciousness  by  the  stim- 


184 


STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 


ulus  of  some  need,  and  the  result  is  not  only  a new  or  a 
modified  concept,  hut  a judgment,  (b)  A variant  mode  is 
when  there  is  an  attentive  scrutiny  of  one  case  and  ab- 
straction of  its  interesting  feature,  which  is  later  discov- 
ered in  or  applied  to  other  cases.  (2)  At  the  other  extreme, 
differentiation  and  assimilation  on  the  plane  of  habit  ac- 
count for  the  growth  of  a conceptual  function.  But  not 
only  may  this  come  into  clear  consciousness  at  a later 
stage  (the  apparent  beginning  of  the  concept  in  (b) ),  but 
a slight  conscious  guidance  must  be  assumed  at  the  time 
of  each  adjustment  in  the  process  of  development. 

Similarly,  the  mode  in  which  these  concepts  function 
varies  between  two  limits : unconscious  habit,  or  the  maxi- 
mum of  adaptedness,  and  purely  theoretical  abstract  judg- 
ment, representing  the  maximum  felt  need  of  readaptation 
and  systematic  attempt  to  that  end.  Neither  extreme  has 
much  of  any  place  in  appreciation,  but  there  is  a nearer 
approach  to  the  habit  side.  The  conceptual  function  is 
stimulated  by  musical  examples  ; and  when  there  is  clear 
conception  at  the  time  of  listening  it  is  usually  due  to 
some  structural  device  that  attracts  the  attention  from  its 
familiarity  or  novelty  or  difficulty,  for  the  familiar  or  re- 
iterated may  readily  provoke  the  question  why . Thus  the 
occurrence  of  the  scale  form  as  a melodic  motive,  the 
-repeated  indication  of  the  keynote  (or  sometimes  its  con- 
cealment by  strange  transitions),  and  some  striking  alter- 
ation of  the  rhythmic  figure  may  serve  as  stimuli.  Indeed 
various  emotional  interests  may  help  attract  conceptual 
attention  to  structure. 

Ill 

In  this  section  certain  phases  of  musical  conception 
that  have  already  been  suggested  must  be  discussed.  The 
following  closely  related  questions  will  require  attention : 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC 


185 


(1)  What  is  the  place  of  imagery,  and  (2)  what  the  place 
of  feeling  and  habit  in  musical  conception?  (3)  Are 
these  concepts  concrete  or  abstract?  and  (4)  qualitative 
or  quantitative?  (5)  What  is  the  difference  between 
thinking  in  and  thinking  about  music?  and  (6)  is  musi- 
cal thought  to  be  characterized  as  immediate  or  mediate  ? 
. 1.  A study,  impossible  in  this  article,  of  the  psycho- 
logical and  logical  problems  of  correct  intonation  would 
show  that  the  significance  and  the  actual  content  of  a 
tone  are  not  always  in  precise  agreement ; that  a correct 
image  need  not  be  substituted  for  a false  pitch  in  order 
that  its  musical  connections  be  duly  appreciated;  and 
that  one  and  the  same  content  may  in  some  cases  have 
two  different  meanings  that  are  both  valid,  a case  some- 
what analogous  to  the  figure  of  speech  or  the  pun.  Yet 
obviously  there  is  a limit  to  this  possible  discrepancy 
between  structure  and  function.  Again,  it  was  pointed  out 
above  that  the  functioning  of  guiding  concepts  and  of 
musical  outlines  and  the  process  of  recognition  through 
these  and  other  concepts  do  not  demand  the  presence  of 
a tonal  image  or  series  of  images.  For  instance,  it  is  said 
that  a given  melody  may  have  a primary  tonic  though 
such  a tonic  is  not  found  as  one  of  the  actual  series  of 
presented  pitches  ; for  in  this  case  the  tones  that  are  pre- 
sented invoke  the  musical  imagination,  working  according 
to  the  laws  of  musical  structure,  to  supply  the  missing 
tonic.  If  this  means  a demand,  not  to  correct  the  intona- 
tion of  the  tone  which  purports  to  stand  for  the  tonic, 
but  to  fill  out  through  imagination  a scale  position  unoc- 
cupied during  the  progress  of  the  melody,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  actual  music  demands  this  of  the  listener.  In 
other  words,  it  is  doubtful  whether  any  melody  which  is 
felt  as  complete,  unitary,  and  beautiful  essentially  depends 
upon  and  implies  a fundamental  tone  that  pretends  to  no 


186 


STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 


place  in  its  structure.  But  if  the  proposed  theory  be  ad- 
mitted, it  is  then  unnecessary  to  posit  the  existence  of 
atonic  melodies,  whose  adequate  musical  meaning  does 
not  depend  upon  the  reference  of  all  its  tones  to  one 
and  the  same  fundamental.1  No  decision  of  this  question 
is  here  offered.  But  we  would  suggest  that  if  a melody 
has  a tonic,  whether  actually  given  or  only  implied  in  its 
structure,  the  appreciation  of  the  tonic’s  value  at  any 
time  does  not  depend  upon  the  presence  of  any  vivid 
auditory  image  of  it. 

A recent  experimental  study  on  tonal  images  and  judg- 
ments has  some  bearing  upon  our  musical  problem.2  A 
few  conclusions  of  this  research  may  here  be  cited : ( a ) 
The  auditory  image  is  but  a part  of  the  memory  image  of 
tone;  it  is  supplemented  by  images  from  other  modalities. 
( b ) The  auditory  image  wanes  after  two  seconds  and 
may  be  gone  at  sixty  seconds,  (c)  The  supplementary 
images  may  aid  as  identifying  marks  when  the  auditory 
core  has  disappeared.  Judgments  of  identity  or  differ- 
ence between  pitches  may  thus  ( d ) be  independent  of  the 
presence  of  any  auditory  image,  or  (e)  be  aided  by  an  un- 
noticed auditory  image,  as  in  assimilative  recognition ; 
or  ( f ) be  quite  dependent  upon  a clear  auditory  image. 
“ The  deliberate  use  of  the  image  as  a standard  of  com- 
parison is  a more  complicated  device,  a roundabout  path 
indicative  of  obstacles,  uncertainty,  and  hesitancy,”  and 
its  results  are  comparatively  uncertain. 

It  should  be  remarked  that  in  such  experiments  as 
yield  these  conclusions  the  conditions  are  made  very 
simple,  while  in  musical  experience  they  are  very  com- 
plex ; that  much  finer  sensory  discriminations  are  called 

1 Meyer  asserts  the  existence  of  such  atonic  melody.  Cf.  his  Contributions 
to  a Psychological  Theory  of  Music. 

2 Cf . Whipple,  in  A merican  Journal  of  Psychology , vols.  xii,  xiii. 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC 


187 


for  in  the  experiments  than  in  ordinary  musical  experience ; 
and  that  the  purpose  of  the  experiments  is  to  examine 
and  test  an  intellectual  function,  while  musical  thought 
aims  at  a higher  realization  of  aesthetic  values.  Thus  the 
two  cases  are  not  quite  parallel.  Thought  having  imme- 
diate value  function  is  more  apt  to  employ  imagery,  other 
conditions  being  equal.  The  constant  presentation  of  new 
auditory  sensations  in  music  tends  to  strengthen  and  pro- 
long the  life  of  those  images,  such  as  the  tonic,  which 
have  the  most  intimate  and  numerous  connections  with 
the  new  material ; while  in  the  competition  other  images, 
in  proportion  as  their  meaning  is  subordinate  in  the  mel- 
ody, are  driven  from  the  field.  This  remark  applies  rather 
to  single  images  than  to  series  or  groups,  for  the  con- 
scious significance  either  of  a phrase  or  of  a melodic 
outline  may  be  great  though  its  foundation  in  imagery  is 
very  apt  to  be  absent.  On  the  same  principle  climactic 
tones  and  tones  important  as  transition  points  tend  to  be 
strengthened,  within  certain  limits,  as  images. 

Conclusion  (f)  above  shows  that  in  music  images  are 
more  prominent  when  one’s  attitude  is  questioning,  when 
values  are  not  well  ascertained.  In  proportion  as  certain 
connections  of  pitch  are  familiar  and  no  difficulty  is  felt 
about  them,  clear  images  would  drop  out.  Even  here, 
however,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the  attitude  of  the 
musician  (value-searching  and  finding)  tends  to  sift  out 
his  imagery  and  to  strengthen  much  of  it  because  it 
is  a sign  of  value ; i.  e.  musical  habituation  may  involve 
a deepening  of  the  value-searching  consciousness  and  a 
strengthening  of  overt  memory,  and  not  a mere  elimina- 
tion of  images. 

The  need  of  auditory  imagery  when  musical  thought 
is  especially  problematic  is  exemplified  in  one’s  early 
attempt  fully  to  appreciate  a harmonized  melodv  from  the 


188  STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 


score  without  rendering  it  on  an  instrument.  Whether 
one  hums,  whistles,  or  sings  the  air,  or  attempts  a quite 
silent  reading,  there  is  a demand  for  the  simultaneofi*|£" 
imagery  of  two  or  more  tones.  At  one  stage  of  practice, 
at  least,  the  musical  values  are  not  realized  through  visual 
attention  to  the  notation,  however  active  thought  may  be 
in  tracing  relationships.  One  must  hear  with  the  mental 
ear  the  entire  musical  structure.  As  this  feat,  even  in  case 
of  the  simplest  harmonies,  may  be  at  first  a difficult  one, 
a keen  activity  of  other  senses,  visual  and  kinaesthetic, 
may  he  called  forth  as  associative  supports  of  auditory 
imagery ; and  appeal  may  he  made  to  the  device  of  a 
rapid  succession  of  tones  as  a substitute  for  their  strict 
simultaneity,  until  by  the  aid  of  incipient  movements  of 
execution  the  right  auditory  imagery  may  be  aroused  and 
established.  As  time  goes  on,  some  of  the  motor  and  kin- 
aesthetic  elements  may  be  eliminated,  until  auditory  images 
are  more  directly  excited  by  the  visual  stimuli.  Whether 
for  some  temperaments  and  at  a later  stage  of  maturity  mu- 
sical satisfaction  might  be  independent  of  any  immediate 
auditory  content,  either  of  sensation  or  of  image,  cannot 
be  positively  asserted ; but  it  is  conceivable  that  the  visual 
symbols  might  arouse  such  a rich  intellectual  content  (the 
insight  into  musical  structure)  as  to  awaken  the  aesthetic 
sense  of  value. 

It  is  no  doubt  true  1 that,  other  things  being  equal,  the 
intensity  of  emotion  decreases  as  percepts  and  images  give 
place  to  abstract  concepts.  But  this  does  not  deny  that  a 
steady  interest  and  a quiet  sentiment  may  attend  the  less 
imaginative  type  of  thinking  which,  because  of  the  keen- 
ness of  abstract  insight,  may  at  intervals  be  reinforced  by 
strong  emotional  thrills.  Nor  can  it  be  denied  that  this  e 
type  of  feeling  may  be  aesthetic. 

1 Cf.  Ribot,  Psychology  of  the  Emotions , English  translation,  p.  317. 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC  189 

2.  Enough  has  been  said  above  under  the  topics  of  the 
formation  and  functioning  of  concepts  and  the  condi- 
tions under  which  musical  imagery  is  employed  to  show 
that  the  habit  aspect  of  thought  is  prominent  in  music. 
Indeed,  every  concept  is  an  expression  of  habit  or  its 
readjustment,  while  every  habit  embodies  the  value  of  a 
concept.  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  habit  means  always 
the  elimination  of  high  types  of  consciousness.  There  are 
habits  of  feeling1  or  thinking  as  well  as  of  movement.  A 
concept  is  a complex  affair,  having  its  novel  and  its  familiar 
aspects ; and  it  may  at  once  occupy  part  of  one’s  atten- 
tive interest  and  extend  its  roots  down  into  the  depths  of 
that  marginal  region  dominated  by  subconscious  habit. 
In  listening  to  music  the  attention  is  not  occupied  solely 
by  auditory  sensations ; it  is  their  combination  that  is 
striking  for  its  novelty,  its  strangeness,  its  beauty,  its  ex- 
emplification of  this  or  that  principle  or  meaning.  This 
combination  is  an  objectified  and  individualized  concept, 
and  its  appreciation  involves  the  conceptional  function ; 
that  is,  the  adaptation  of  a habit  to  a particular  case.  The 
combination  is  not  a mere  physical  datum,  but  is  depend- 
ent on  organic  and  mental  conditions.  Even  when  long 
familiarity  has  shaped  one’s  reaction  to  it  into  a specific 
habit,  it  is,  as  it  were,  a physiological  assumption  which 
remains  to  be  tested  by  each  new  case ; and  the  feeling 
of  the  test  is  a conceptual  feeling,  as  is  also  the  resulting 
satisfaction. 

That  which  functions  conceptually  in  appreciation  is 
thus  a habit,  an  apperceptive  mass,  a subjective  generic 
form  correspondent  to  the  form  of  combination  objectified 
in  the  music.  This  form  or  habit  may  be  structurally  com- 
posed, in  part  at  least,  of  ( a ) musical  imagery,  auditory, 
kinsesthetic,  or  visual ; (b)  extra-musical  ideas,  verbal  or 
concrete ; (c)  feeling  or  emotion,  including  pleasure,  pain, 


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and  feelings  of  tendency  or  activity;  or  (d)  as  activity  it 
may  be  the  subconscious  aspect  of  the  appreciative  process 
and  so  far  forth  structurally  indescribable. 

It  has  been  shown  above  that  the  concept  may  involve 
a feeling  of  tendency  in  a certain  direction,  a feeling  of  the 
limit  of  such  musical  movement,  and  a feeling  of  possible 
variation  within  limits.  The  relation  of  a pitch  to  the 
tonic,  the  shake,  and  all  variation  from  correct  intonation 
may  be  examples.  When  there  is  a feeling  of  tendency 
its  direction  need  not  be  abstractly  defined  as  up  or  down, 
toward  or  away  from,  increase  of  complexity  or  resolution 
into  simpler  harmony,  in  order  that  it  be  a concept;  the 
nature  of  the  strain  sensations  and  other  feelings  con- 
stituting it  may  suffice  to  differentiate  it  and  render  it 
more  than  a mere  vague,  meaningless  feeling.  So,  too, 
its  limits  need  not  be  imaged  in  advance ; if  felt  at  the 
right  moment  as  either  resting-points  or  counter  tenden- 
cies, the  concept  is  thus  defined. 

3.  The  distinction  was  above  made  between  the  indi- 
vidual concept,  as  of  this  unique  melody,  and  the  uni- 
versal concept,  exemplified  when  some  genetic  feature  or 
outline  is  abstracted  from  the  total  musical  movement. 
But  the  distinction  that  now  concerns  us  is  that  between 
a narrower  and  a broader  view  of  the  very  nature  of 
music.  The  one  would  regard  musical  appreciation  as 
an  isolated  activity  of  the  mind  whose  sole  content  and 
meaning  consists  in  tones  and  their  relations ; the  other 
views  it  as  continuous  with  human  life  at  large  and  in 
significant  connection  therewith.  So  two  contrasting  theo- 
ries are  found  in  musical  sesthetics  : ( a ) that  of  the  intel- 
lectual formalist  and  (b)  that  of  the  idealist  or  symbolist. 
For  the  latter,  music  has  extra-musical  values  and  expres- 
sive powers.  Tones  in  their  structural  relationships  have 
vicarious  value ; they  stand  for  spiritual  relationships.  But 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC  191 

these  are  of  a general  and  abstract  kind,  and  therefore 
not  readily  or  adequately  to  be  stated  in  linguistic  terms. 
From  this  point  of  view  music  is  the  pure  form  of  our 
inner  life.  This  bare  form  is  objectified  in  tonal  material 
and  thus  given  an  artistic  value.  But  as  appreciated  it  is 
apperceived  by  subjective  forms  in  the  hearer’s  mental 
make-up,  forms  which,  as  compared  with  the  objective 
forms,  may  have  a different  concrete  filling  of  visual  and 
other  imagery  and  a broader  meaning.  Auditory  sensa- 
tions are  but  a fraction  of  the  richness  of  our  inner  life ; 
yet,  when  combined  according  to  the  universal  laws  of 
the  mind,  they  function  as  substitutes  or  symbols  and 
serve  to  arouse  further  mental  content. 

u To  think  concretely  is  to  represent  general  relations 
as  embodied  in  particular  instances ; ” 1 or  in  a related 
sense,  it  is  to  think  reality  or  real  objects  in  their  whole- 
ness, and  not  sacrifice  this  to  some  one  or  more  important 
aspects. 

a.  Now  for  the  musical  formalist  the  standard  of 
concreteness  is  the  whole  unique  piece  of  music  viewed 
as  a complex  of  tones  in  various  relations.  Judged  by 
this  criterion,  he  thinks  abstractly  in  proportion  as  his 
attention  isolates  some  one  feature  like  the  rhythm,  which 
may  also  have  a universal  character.  But  since,  whether 
as  performer  or  listener,  he  will  in  the  main  regard  this 
feature  as  embodied  in  the  given  instance,  since  tone  still 
remains  the  substance  and  material  of  his  thought,  it  is 
to  that  extent  concrete. 

b.  For  the  symbolist,  on  the  other  hand,  the  standard 
of  concreteness  is  found  in  human  experience  at  large  or 
the  nature  of  spirit.  The  structure  of  music  embodies 
universal  relations  that  obtain  through  all  experience. 
Under  this  test  musical  thought  is  concrete  only  in  case 

1 Baldwin’s  Dictionary  of  Philosophy , article  “ Concrete.” 


192  STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 


of  a complete  fusion  of  the  subjective  mood  and  imagery 
with  the  objectively  given  movement,  only  when  the  pre- 
sentation has  as  its  subjective  aspect  an  insight  into  and 
feeling  for  the  richness  of  life.  But  the  presentation  may 
he  distinguished  as  a system  of  signs,  a language  which 
stands  primarily  for  a system  of  abstract  relations.  In 
the  more  introspective  and  reflective  hearing  of  music, 
then,  one  may  devote  attention  to  this  language  and  its 
abstract  meaning ; or,  on  the  other  hand,  the  mind  may 
be  given  up  to  the  mere  subjective  play  of  feeling  and 
imagery,  abandoning  all  notice  of  the  musical  movement 
and  structure.  In  both  the  latter  cases  thought  is  abstract 
according  to  the  standard  of  the  idealist. 

4.  In  order  further  to  determine  the  nature  of  musical 
concepts,  a distinction  should  be  drawn  between  ( a ) popu- 
lar, ( b ) scientific,  and  (c)  aesthetic  concepts,  which  may 
reveal  also  the  relative  place  of  qualitative  and  quantita- 
tive determinations  in  musical  thought. 

a.  The  popular  concept  is  above  all  practical ; it  has 
reference  to  the  action  of  one’s  self  or  others  or  to  those 
phenomena  in  the  world  which  manifestly  affect  us ; it  is 
thus  often  embodied  in  plan  or  purpose.  At  the  same 
time,  it  may  be  so  related  to  individual  satisfaction  as  to 
have  an  aesthetic  as  well  as  a moral  value.  Among  its 
constituents  are  images,  qualitative  relations,  feelings,  and 
value  attitudes,  so  far  as  these  serve  to  mediate  the  appro- 
priate reactions  ; but  these  become  gradually  supplemented 
by  ideas  of  quantitative  relations.  It  exhibits  different 
stages  of  development.  For  instance,  in  the  popular  con- 
cept of  the  color  red,  the  experience  or  object  is  at  first 
relatively  unanalyzed.  Red  is  a unique  quality,  though 
regarded  as  one  of  the  class  color.  It  is  itself  a class  idea, 
denoting  any  of  the  various  shades  or  tints  of  red ; and 
each  of  these  is  a unique  quality,  though  all  together  are 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC 


193 


capable  of  a serial  arrangement  in  which  indefinite  ideas 
of  more  and  less  early  play  a part.  At  a higher  stage 
there  is  a more  definite  determination  of  the  serial  order 
as  quantitative  by  reference  to  a standard  series  of  objec- 
tive color  tones  as  a pattern.  The  number  of  members  in 
such  a series  may  be  arbitrary,  but  by  reference  to  it  any 
new  instance  of  red  would  receive  a numerical  status. 
There  may  further  develop  a quantitative  concept  of  the 
causes  and  relations  of  any  specific  qualitative  effect,  by 
reference  either  to  the  mode  of  mixing  paints,  etc.,  or  to 
the  extent  of  red  space  which  will  have  a desired  effect. 
While  through  such  means  the  general  concept  gains  in 
specification,  yet  in  itself  red  is  still  taken  as  a unique 
quality. 

b.  The  scientific  concept  functions  immediately  to 
enable  the  intellect  to  classify  and  explain  the  fact,  e.  g. 
red,  in  the  most  universal  manner,  to  grasp  it  along  with 
other  facts  in  the  most  comprehensive  and  unitary  system. 
Its  ultimate  function,  however,  is  to  make  possible  a more 
adequate  control  of  the  reactions  of  humanity  to  the  phe- 
nomenon ; i.  e.  it  is  the  function  of  the  popular  concept 
perfected.  Nor  is  the  distinction  between  the  scientific 
and  the  practical  attitudes  or  methods  rigid.  Already  in 
the  latter  we  have  seen  a growing  analysis  of  the  crude 
whole  of  experience  into  aspects,  and  therefore  some  ab- 
straction from  the  immediate  felt  value  of  the  total.  Such 
analysis  and  abstraction  are  in  the  scientific  concept  more 
extreme  and  disinterested,  yet  while  the  effort  is  made  to 
keep  personal  bias  and  feeling  out  of  its  structure,  it 
tacitly  assumes  its  adaptation  to  the  essential  needs  of 
humanity.  Such  a theoretical  notion  shows  the  common 
ground  of  red  and  other  colors  and  finally  other  kinds  of 
quality,  such  as  sound,  in  reducing  their  differences  to 
quantitative,  measurable  differences  in  a mode  of  motion. 


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It  thus  substitutes  a formula  for  a set  of  images  and  feel- 
ings. But  all  qualities  and  values  are  not  eliminated  from 
the  formula.  For  both  the  ultimate  units  assumed  in  the 
scientific  account  and  their  orderly  relation  or  unity  are 
qualitative.  While  their  relations  have  become  measura- 
ble, such  measuring  means  a checking  of  one  qualitative 
experience  by  another  taken  as  a standard.  Indeed  the 
aim  of  the  abstraction  is  in  part  a more  adequate  valuation 
and  feeling.  So  the  scientific  definition  of  the  predicate 
(as  red)  will  in  the  end  be  able  to  contribute  to  and  de- 
termine the  value  of  the  subject  (red  objects  in  human 
experience). 

c.  The  function  of  the  aesthetic  concept  in  its  primary 
forms  is  to  secure  an  immediate  satisfaction ; it  involves  a 
minimum  of  the  feeling  of  tension  with  law  or  standard. 
In  its  later  developments  this  felt  tension  may  be  a factor, 
when  the  concept’s  function  is  to  comprehend,  secure,  and 
enrich  an  effect  which  without  the  aid  of  more  elaborate 
concepts  would  escape  appreciation.  In  other  words,  it 
comes  to  aim  at  the  maximum  of  possible  value  which  is 
in  part  determined  by  a complex  standard  and  laws.  The 
aesthetic  is  rooted  in  the  popular  concept.  Its  notion  of 
red,  for  example,  is  at  first  that  of  a unique  and  pleasing 
qualitative  experience.  Red  effects  are  correlated  with 
other  color  effects  and  partially  differentiated  from  them 
as  warm  or  stimulating  colors.  The  higher  development 
of  the  aesthetic  feeling  for  relation  (including  contrast, 
harmony,  and  discord)  involves  a keener  discrimination  of 
values  and  a more  idealized  feeling  of  the  value  of  red. 
Red  is  no  longer  so  isolated  as  an  experience,  but  it  is  felt, 
imaged,  or  thought  as  belonging  in  certain  typical  con- 
nections and  as  not  belonging  in  others.  The  experience 
is  largely  qualitative,  and  involves  a sense  of  wholeness, 
red  being  one,  though  the  chief,  feature  in  this  whole. 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC 


195 


This  notion  is  still  further  specified  through  the  supple- 
ment first  of  quantitative  ideas  of  how  the  effect  is  physi- 
cally obtainable  (compare  the  later  stage  of  the  popular 
concept),  and  then  of  aesthetic  laws  both  broader  and 
more  precise  which  reveal  the  grounds  of  the  effect  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  criteria  of  value  on  the  other. 

The  notion  of  red  has  been  instanced  because  in  its 
different  degrees  of  completeness  it  may  have  chiefly 
practical,  artistic,  aesthetic,  or  theoretic  functions.  It  is 
easy  to  substitute  a musical  example,  but  this  need  not 
be  here  worked  out  save  for  the  higher  aesthetic  concept. 
The  trained  musician  will  have  such  a complex,  relational 
concept  of  the  leading  note,  for  instance.  Though  this 
be  sensed  or  imaged,  it  is  felt  in  its  proper  relations. 
It  is  no  mere  synthesis  either  of  apprehension  or  of  per- 
ception, to  adopt  Lotze’s  distinctions.1  That  is,  it  is  not 
merely  lumped  together  with  other  tonal  values  in  one 
vague  consciousness,  nor  is  its  place  in  the  movement 
or  series  one  of  mere  succession;  its  relations  are  not 
exhausted  in  the  before-and-after  relation.  Rather  are 
its  relations  appreciated  as  based  on  certain  grounds 
(the  structure  of  the  scale,  the  laws  of  melody  and  har- 
mony, etc.),  whether  these  be  thought  abstractly  or  not. 
Therefore  the  tone  is  felt  as  leading  tone ; as  such  predi- 
cate it  gains  a definite  import  in  the  form,  and  the  hearer 
has  discovered  a partial  rationale  of  the  effect.  Such  an 
attempt  in  musical  experience  to  grasp  the  effectiveness, 
to  trace  it  to  its  cause,  and  so  to  control  its  realization, 
though  still  retaining  imagery  and  feeling,  exhibits  its 
similarity  to  scientific  conception,  and  indeed  depends 
indirectly  upon  that  for  its  success. 

For  though  the  popular,  scientific,  and  higher  aesthetic 
concepts  are  distinguishable,  they  are  bound  together  in 

1 Cf.  Logic , English  translation,  vol.  i,  p.  38. 


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the  total  musical  experience  of  the  race.  ^Esthetic  con- 
cepts often  do  not  rise  above  common-sense  methods, 
only  (as  in  music)  they  have  regard  to  appreciation  rather 
than  to  conduct  or  phenomena  in  the  every-day  world,  and 
thus  they  idealize  their  material,  making  out  of  it  a 
unique  self-articulated  tone  world.  The  concepts  of  the 
performing  artist  would  exhibit  further  similarities  to  the 
concepts  that  function  in  ordinary  practice  on  account  of 
their  common  relation  to  doing.  Further,  the  most  tech- 
nical and  scientific  concepts  ultimately  react  into  appreci- 
ation for  its  advancement,  though  not  necessarily  in  the 
individual  life.  For  musical  aesthetics  is  distinct  from 
mathematical  physics,  though  the  latter  may  supplement 
the  former.  So  far  as  the  exact  ratios  of  rhythmic  mea- 
sures, sound  vibrations,  overtones,  etc.,  do  not  enter  into 
the  musical  consciousness,  they  are  not  directly  concepts 
of  musical  aesthetics.  But  even  such  technical  mathe- 
matical concepts  may  conceivably  have  a value  in  training 
one  to  a more  discriminating  appreciation  and  perform- 
ance. For  if  mathematics,  physics,  and  physiology  have 
any  power  to  modify  or  supplement  psychological  law 
and  thus  musical  aesthetics,  then  through  this  intermedia- 
tion they  may  and  ought  to  affect  one’s  attitude  to  music. 
It  may  be  that  only  by  an  appeal  to  mathematics  can 
a clear  and  adequate  insight  into  musical  structure  be 
gained,  and  yield  laws  that  shall  exhibit  the  significance 
of  our  actual  musical  experience.  If  that  be  the  case, 
then  mathematics  is  a means  of  gaining  musical  control. 
But  neither  composer,  performer,  nor  hearer  will  have  in 
mind  such  mathematical  determinations ; these  are  re- 
translated into  relations  of  quality  or  psychological  quan- 
tity (such  as  measurable  distance  in  the  scale),  for  in 
music  itself  one  is  never  directly  concerned  with  physical 
quantity  (such  as  vibration  rates). 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC  197 

Thus  in  most  of  the  directly  aesthetic  and  artistic  activ- 
ity and  even  in  much  musical  practice,  the  requisite  is 
emotional  thought,  vital  interest,  imaginative  sympathy, 
soul ; therefore  the  more  popular  and  aesthetic  concepts. 
But  there  is  a sphere  of  activity  for  the  more  quantitative 
and  scientific  mode  of  conception  also  in  the  system- 
atic study  of  musicians,  in  the  development  of  musical 
tradition  and  systems,  and  in  the  invention  and  perfection 
of  instruments  and  technique.  Nor  can  it  be  doubted  that 
all  this  reacts  ultimately  and  with  power  into  the  inner 
musical  life  of  man. 

5.  A distinction  should  be  made  between  thinking 
in  music  and  thinking  about  music,  but  this  will  require 
little  elaboration  after  the  foregoing  paragraphs.  Uni- 
versal meanings  characterize  each  type  of  thought.  In  the 
former  these  meanings  are  embodied  in  auditory,  kinses- 
thetic,  and  other  sensations  or  imagery  having  direct 
material  value  in  the  musical  experience  ; in  the  latter 
they  are  suggested  by  verbal,  numerical,  or  other  symbolic 
terms,  — symbols  which  have  no  such  direct  value,  but 
are  external  to  the  actual  musical  activity.  Thus  the 
former  thought  mode  is  largely  concrete  and  is  strictly 
a part  of  the  aesthetic  process,  while  the  latter  is  more 
abstract  and  intellectual  in  its  nature.  But  though  their 
distinction  is  readily  formulated  in  theory,  in  practice  a 
sharp  line  cannot  always  be  drawn  between  them.  Thus, 
in  different  degrees,  any  one  of  the  symbols  2-3,  tonic- 
dominant,  C-G,  and  their  staff  representation,  may,  as  a 
mode  of  thought,  shade  over  into  or  be  fused  with  the 
feeling  of  actual  relationship  between  two  tonal  impres- 
sions or  images. 

Recurring  to  the  feeling  of  tendency  explained  in  (2) 
above,  it  is  not  essential  to  the  constitution  or  function- 
ing of  thought  in  music  that  this  feeling  be  defined  as 


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regards  either  its  direction  (e.  g.  accelerando,  up  in  pitch, 
away  from  discord)  or  its  limits  (in  image  or  idea).  Such 
definition  may  he  a phase  of  thought  in  music,  or  again 
it  may  belong  wholly  to  the  sphere  of  thought  about 
music.  The  structure  of  the  former  may  consist  mainly 
in  the  peculiar  quality  of  the  strain  sensations  and  the  feel- 
ing of  check  to  or  satisfaction  of  the  tendency : these  may 
be  sufficient  to  define  respectively  the  tendency  and  its 
limit.  In  thus  far  the  thought  appears  fundamentally 
qualitative  in  its  nature.  Such  thought  is  present  in  the 
actual  sensuous  embodiment  of  these  feelings  as  one  per- 
forms or  listens. 

6.  The  question  about  the  immediate  or  mediate  nature 
of  musical  thought  may  well  be  presented  by  consider- 
ing Gurney’s  views  on  musical  form  and  our  appreciation 
of  it,  with  special  reference  to  the  distinction  between 
briefer  and  longer  musical  movements.1  His  ideas  are 
in  substance  as  follows  : The  real  beauty  of  music  is 
embodied  in  the  shorter  unit  of  movement,  such  as  a 
melodic  phrase.  This,  the  essence  of  music,  is  appreciated 
by  a separate  musical  faculty,  which  is  out  of  all  relation 
to  the  intellect.  The  various  relations  (such  as  likeness, 
difference,  contrast,  balance)  between  phrases  may  be 
cognized  intellectually  ; but  the  phrases,  which  are  unique 
and  individual,  are  of  most  importance  musically.  Plan 
or  conscious  design  can  be  attributed  only  to  the  more 
comprehensive  unities.  The  individual  part  fulfills  no  plan 
and  is  inspired  by  no  end.  The  formal  connection  be- 
tween phrases  may  be  more  or  less  cogent  and  organic, 
it  may  involve  rational  principles ; therefore  the  corre- 
sponding subjective  attitude  may  involve  the  exercise  of 
thought.  But  the  beauty  of  the  single  phrase  is  wholly 
individual  and  inexplicable,  and  is  apprehended  by  the 
1 Power  of  Sound,  pp.  190-206  et  passim. 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC 


199 


unaided  intuition.  The  listener’s  mental  process  is  here 
that  of  immediate  apprehension,  while  there  it  includes 
reflective  or  mediate  thought. 

But  because  the  essence  of  beauty  is  revealed  through 
the  former,  it  appears  that  intellectual  processes,  whether 
of  analysis  or  synthesis,  have  no  aesthetic  validity.  If  the 
interconnections  between  phrases  or  the  more  inclusive 
forms  have  any  effectiveness  or  worth  in  themselves  and 
so  contribute  at  all  to  the  sum  total  of  beauty  (for  from 
this  standpoint  there  is  in  an  extended  piece  only  an 
aggregation  of  successively  appearing  beauties  and  not  a 
complex  beauty  of  the  whole),  such  value  resides  wholly 
in  their  immediate,  individual  aspect ; it  is  merely  given 
to  this  mystical  musical  faculty  and  in  no  wise  determined 
by  thought,  which  is  concerned  with  universals  and  works 
under  the  guidance  of  rational  principles.  In  no  case 
does  appreciation  employ  non-musical  categories.  Regu- 
larity of  tempo  and  rhythm,  fixity  of  pitch,  and  other  fac- 
tors of  musical  form  have  an  immediate  instinctive  value 
rather  than  a reflective  one.  Musical  synthesis  does  not 
involve  intellect  or  culture  : “ And  so  far,  in  these  all- 
essential and  characteristic  forms,  the  general  intellectual 
faculties,  whether  imaginative  or  logical,  seem  to  have  no 
place  at  all : the  unique  faculty  of  coordinating  the  notes 
and  perceiving  the  group  as  a whole  may  be  possessed  by 
the  most  dunderheaded  boor.” 

These  views  certainly  involve  a partial  truth,  but  this  is 
present  only  by  implication  and  is  either  neglected  or 
rejected  by  Gurney  in  the  main.  Yet  the  pressure  of  its 
demands  is  such  as  to  force  him,  in  the  further  descrip- 
tion of  his  position,  to  statements  really  incompatible  with 
the  dualistic  theory  of  thought  and  intuition  just  outlined. 
For  first,  as  to  the  subjective  side,  it  appears  that  the 
musical  unit  cannot  be  merely  given.  In  proportion  as 


200  STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 

he  really  appreciates,  the  listener  is  mentally  active  rather 
than  overpowered  by  his  object.  His  attitude  can  hardly 
he  called  one  of  simple  apprehension,  for  his  mental  con- 
tent is  a complex  unity.  Though  known  relations  have 
no  place  in  his  sense  of  beauty,  the  importance  is  admitted 
of  felt  relations  based  on  associations  due  to  past  experi- 
ence. Evidently  if  the  development  of  musical  intuition 
depends  on  experience,  the  utility  of  the  experience  will 
depend  to  some  extent  on  the  part  played  in  it  by  cogni- 
tive aspects.  The  intuition  is  an  act  of  synthesis,  a group- 
ing , coordinatm^,  phrasm^  ; and  as  its  content  includes 
distinguished  terms  and  felt  relations,  this  implies  an  act 
of  analysis.  As  regards  the  objective  side,  it  is  maintained 
that  musical  form  is  organic  and  involves  strict  interde- 
pendence of  parts,  that  form  is  present  in  proportion  as 
the  sequence  and  mode  of  connection  is  cogent,  and  that 
therefore  the  notion  of  form  is  more  applicable  to  the 
smaller  than  to  the  larger  unities.  However  individual 
and  transcendent  of  entire  comprehension  or  explanation 
a form  may  be,  then,  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  merely 
particular,  as  exclusive  of  all  universal  characteristics.  As 
individual  form,  it  is  the  unity  of  particular  and  universal. 

The  inference  from  such  views  on  musical  form,  re- 
garded either  as  the  subjective  attitude  or  as  the  object,  is 
that  form  is  not  a simple  datum,  for  that  would  be  the 
mere  material  of  appreciation,  but  a complex  process. 
Apprehension  is  complex,  even  in  its  structure,  and  pa- 
tently so  in  its  function  and  meaning.  It  has  its  immedi- 
ate and  mediate  aspects  which  are  never  entirely  divorced. 
If  the  unity,  meaning,  and  beauty  of  a phrase  be  sum- 
marized in  a thrill  of  feeling  and  heightened  pleasure, 
this  is  not  mere  pleasure  nor  mere  immediate  feeling, 
nor  is  it  the  whole  of  appreciation.  Were  that  the  case, 
all  musical  values  would  be  alike  to  one,  or  rather  the 


THE  INTELLECTUAL  ELEMENT  IN  MUSIC  201 

very  possibility  of  their  comparison  and  adjustment  to  a 
standard  would  be  impossible.  This  feeling  is  an  abstrac- 
tion as  compared  with  the  real  process  of  appreciating, 
and  it  is  hut  a sign  or  a portion  of  the  value  that  has 
been  worked  out  in  part  by  the  intellect.  The  feeling  as 
immediate  is  rooted  in  and  organically  continuous  with 
mediating  processes  preceding  it,  and  its  meaning  should 
not  be  sacrificed  to  its  bare  content.  To  divorce  them  is 
not  only  to  be  untrue  to  the  essential  nature  of  the  pro- 
cess, but  to  plunge  one  into  insuperable  theoretical  diffi- 
culties. The  two  sorts  of  musical  unity,  that  within  the 
phrase  and  that  between  phrases,  are  not  different  in 
kind,  therefore,  but  only  in  degree  ; just  as  apprehension 
and  reflection  are  not  distinct  faculties  or  modes  of  men- 
tal activity,  but  both  involve,  though  in  different  degrees, 
the  two  factors  of  mediation  and  immediate  feeling. 


